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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--------------------------- -------------------------------DIVERSIFIED GENERAL CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation,

)
)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
)

CASE NO. 15462

vs.
)

WHITE BARN GOLF COURSE, INC. , a
Utah corporation, KEITH B. DOWNS,
ALBERT SANONE, A 0 K L\NDS, INC. ,
a Utah corporation, and JOHN DOES,
1 through 8 inclusive,

)
)
)

Defendants and Respondents.
)

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff, Diversified General Corporation (DGC), brought
this action to recover the balance of a "finder's" fee to which
it deems itself entitled by the terms and provisions of a
written and subsequent oral agreement with defendant, White Barn
Golf Course, Inc.

(White Barn), for having found a purchaser for

certain real property owned and offered for sale by White Barn.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants filed a Motion for SUilllI!ary Judgment which was
subsequently ~rgued to and heard by the court.

Summary Judgment

was awarded in favor of defendants on the grounds that one who
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undertakes for a fee to secure a purchaser for a property
belonging to another comes within the purview of the Real
Estate Broker's Statute, 7A UCA §61-2-1 et seq.

(1953), which

precludes an action for recovery of compensation by one not
licensed as a real estate broker or salesman.
RELIEF,SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, White Barn, seeks an order affirming the
decision of the lower court and the Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 6, 1976, a "Finder's Agreement" (Agreement)
was executed between DGC and White Barn, whereby DGC was given
the right to find a buyer for White Barn's golf course and
condominiUIII development for a specified sales price.

The ager

of appellant, DGC, conceded that the purpose of the Agreement
was to give me the opportunity to find a buyer that would resu
in a sale (Record at 30).
After the closing DGC agreed to the payment of its fee i·
installments, with a downpayment of $35,000.00 (designated as
sales commission), which downpayment was paid and received by
DGC (Record at 3 and 30).
However, White Barn refused to pay the balance of the fr
and on March 28, 1977, DGC filed a complaint to recover the
balance of $115, 000. 00.

On June 9, 1977, the defendants movec

11
the lower court for Summary Judgment on the grounds that DGC

-2-
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activities in finding a buyer were those of a real estate broker
or salesman, that DGC was not a licensed broker or salesman, and
therefore, could not lawfully recover a finder's fee (Record at
28-30).

It

was after the present lawsuit was filed that l·fuite

Barn discovered that DGC was not a licensed real estate broker or
agent (Record at 35).
on June 21, 1977.

The motion was argued before the lower court

On August 30, 1977, the court, by memorandum

decision (Record at 39-41) granted the Motion for Summary Judgment,
and summary judgment was entered in favor of defendants on

en

September 26, 1977 (Record at 48).

Plaintiff thereafter filed this

appeal on October 6, 1977.
ARGUMENT
The issue raised by this appeal is do the real estate

iu.

broker's statutes apply to one who acts under contract for a
col!lIIlission to find a buyer of real property?

POINT I
THE UTAH CASE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A
REAL ESTATE BROKER OR SALESMAN, AND A FINDER.
'e

The Utah case law holds unequivocally that a finder is
~c

within the real estate law.

The pertinent parts of the applicable

sections of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which are to be
construeJ herein are set forth as follows hereafter and then
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placed in excerpt form with their applicable provisions:
It shall be unlawful for any person, copartnership
or corporation to engage in the business, act in the
capacity of, advertise or assume to act as a real
estate broker or a real estate salesman within this
state without first obtaining a license under the
provisions of this chapter.

7A UCA §61-2-1 (1953).
The term "real estate broker" within the meaning of
this chapter shall include all persons, partnershius
associations and corporations, foreign and dornesti~,'
who for another and for a fee, commission or other
valuable consideration, or who in the expectation or
upon the promise of receiving or collecting a fee,
commission or other valuable consideration, . . .
assists or directs in the procuring of prospects or
the negotiations or closing of any transaction which
does or is calculated to result in the sale, exchange,
leasing or renting of any real estate . . . .

7A UCA §61-2-2 (1953).
(a) No person, partnership, association, or corporation
shall bring or maintain an action in any court of this
state for the recovery of commission, a fee, or compensation for any act done or service rendered the doing
or rendering of which is prohibited under the provisions
of this act to other than licensed real estate brokers,
unless such person was duly licensed hereunder as a
real estate broker at the time of the doing of such act
or the rendering of such service . . . .

7A UCA §61-2-18 (1953).
IT SHALL BE UNLAWFUL FOR ANY ... CORPORATION TO ... ACT AS
A REAL ESTATE BROKER OR REAL ESTATE SALESMAN WITHIN THU
STATE WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING A LICENSE ....
7A UCA §61-2-1 (1953) .
. . . . "REAL ESTATE BROKER" ... SHALL INCLUDE ALL ... CORPORAT!,
... WHO FOR ANOTHER AND FOR A FEE ... ASSISTS OR DIRECTS I!
THE PROCURING OF PROSPECTS ... WHICH DOES OR IS CALCULATE
TO RESULT IN THE SALE, ... OF ANY REAL ESTATE. · · ·
7A UCA §61-2-2 (1953).

-4-
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1

A. Andersen v. Johnson, 108, Utah 417, 160 P.2d 725 (1945),
is not in point.

It involves a case wherein one of the parties

was a licensed real estate broker.

The litigation involved the

broker's contract with a third party to pay a fee for prospects
brought to him for listing of real property.

That case held that

a real estate prospect referred to one interested in the purchase
of realty.
Counsel relies strongly on Justice Wade's dissent in that
case wherein Justice Wade excludes from the intent and purpose of
the statute the casual or remote influence of a stenographer or
other party.

The case, nevertheless, does not exclude a finder

for the purchase of real property from the provisions of the real
estate law of the State of Utah.
B. Chase v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 P.2d 1019 (1959), is
the second case discussed by appellant's counsel.
Counsel disregards the specific and direct holding of the
case, to-wit:
. . .Appellant contends the court erred in concluding
that he was precluded from recovery because he had
not obtained a real estate broker's license because
(1) the real estate broker's statutes do not a 1 to
one-who merel introduces a u er to an owner; and
nor to transactions in t e oi an gas usiness;
and (3) because oil and gas leases are not real estate.
We find no merit to any of these contentions.
(Emphasis supplied)
Chase v. Morgan, supra, at 1020.

-5-
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That case specifically and clearly holds that there is

1

merit in the contention that the real estate proker' s statute:

do not apply to one who merely introduces a buyer to an owner.
Counsel makes great point of dictum by Justice Wade
wherein it is stated in the opinion:
.... Such an agreement contemplated more than the
mere finding or introduction of a buyer and clearly
was the sort of activity embraced within the
definition of "Real estate broker" quoted above . . .
Chase v. Morgan, supra, at 1021.
It is suggested that the reading of the whole decision

forces the inescapable conclusion that the statement is simplJ
an a fortiori argument.

The additional elements added to

introducing the buyer and seller make it follow with stronger
reason that the activity fell within the real estate broker's
statutes.

The case does not say the additional elements are

necessary to bringing a finder's contract within the
C.

stat~e.

All fine distinctions and strained reasoning being:

to one side, the Utah law says a corporation which "assists or
directs in the procuring of prospects" calculated to result ir
a sale is a broker.

The appellant corporation, DGC, falls

within the prohibitions of the statute and should not be all 0'•
a fee.

POINT II
THE UTAH LAW STATED ABOVE IS MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN THE
CALIFOR..~IA LAW.
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Appellant's Brief relies upon the California statute and
case law.

A reading of the applicable statutes demonstrates the
-

difference between Utah and California law of brokers.
The California law referred to in Section 10131 (a) of the
Real Estate Regulations is a definition of a real estate broker:
(a) ~ells or off:rs to sell, buys or offers to buy,
solicits prospective sellers or purchasers of, solicits
or obtains listings of, or negotiates the purchase,
sale, or exchange of real property.
§10131 (a) Real Estate Regulations.
The Utah law in the Utah Code Annotated defines a
broker differently:
... assists or directs in the procuring of prospects or
the negotiation or closing of any transaction which
does or is calculated to result in the sale, exchange,
leasing or renting of any real estate.
UCA §61-2-2 (1953).
While the California law above stated does refer to
soliciting prospective sellers or purchasers, the Utah law is
much more restrictive wherein it says "assists or directs in
the procuring of prospects or the negotiation or closing ... "
The reading of the two statutes indicates that the applicable
California case law construing the California statute is not of
value as any authority to aid this court in the construing of
the Utah statute.

The California statute and the California

case law allow for finders and finder's fees.

The Utah case

law and the Utah statutes do not.

- 7-
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POINT III
OTHER STATES HAVE REPUDIATED THE CALIFORNIA POSITION
WITH RESPECT TO ALLOWING FINDERS OUTSIDE OF THE
BROKERAGE LAWS.

Although counsel refers to California's approach

as·~

enlightened one", that view has long since been discounted ana
disallowed in other states.

As early as 1931 in the Washingti

case of Grammer v. Skagit Valley Lumber Co., 162 Washington,
677, 299 Pacific Reporter 376, the Supreme Court listened to,
repudiated all of the arguments proposed by counsel in this

Ci

In determining if the salesman in that case was acting as a
broker, or could avoid the consequences of the broker law by
being a finder, the court held the finder-broker distinction c
not lie and the activities covered in the case were that ofa
broker.

The court quoted the case of Baird v. Krancer, 138

Misc. Rep. 360, 246 N.Y.S. 85, 87 and said:
* * *"The court is constrained from the evidence in
the case submitted by the plaintiff to arrive at the
conclusion that this was an action for real estate
brokerage as contemplated by section 440 of the Real
Property Law >'< >'< "'and it was clearly the intent of the
Le islature to rotect dealers in real estate from
un-licensed persons w o acted as rokers that t e
statute was enacted. To interpret the statute so as
to permit men under the guise of an alleged introduction to evade section 440 would simply nullify
the statute and would expose the public by judicial
interpretation to the very evi Zs that the Leg is Zature
and the reputable brokers of the state sought to
pr·otcct i t f1 om . .,., "'" .,., If real estate is going_ to be
1

the principal element involved in the transact~on, ~
broker has to have a license and cannot evade its .
necessity by referring to the services as originati~
or introducing or any ~ther fantastic term. A

-8-
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fr

statute enacted for the protection of the public must
be interpreted fairly to effect the purposes of its
enactment.
It is not to be rendered in~ffectual by
a strained construction.
The essential feature of a broker's employment is to
bring the parties together in an amicable frame of mind
with an attitude toward each other and toward the
'
transaction in hand which permits their working out the
terms of their a reement.
The ma reach that a reement
without his ai or inter erence.
Indee , in a transaction of any magnitude, the terms would never be
settled beforehand or negotiated finally by the broker.
Each party would always wait until in direct contact with
the other side in order that he might drive the best
bargain possible.
The broker would have no opportunity
to induce one party or the other to agree upon some or all
of the terms and would not be expected to do so. He would
be entitled to his commission if the parties agreed upon
terms originally proposed by one or the other, or agreed
between themselves after the introduction.
This does not mean that the broker has not negotiated
the transaction. He does that when he builds up in the
minds of the parties a desire to do the business. He
never cares what the terms are, so long as the agreement
occurs.
If the statute does not apply to such a situation,
then it is a toothless enactment. Every unlicensed broker
will make the same argument that the plaintiff here has
made, that he did not have to bring the parties to actual
agreement upon all the details, that that phase was
something for the parties themselves to determine. In
short, every un-licensed broker will be enabled to carry
on his business just as he did before the statute came
into existence, simply by calling himself a finder, an
originator, an introducer, instead of a broker.
This
would be an absurd limitation of the statute and one
unfounded in reason or policy.
A broker 'negotiates' just
as much when he brings parties together in such frame of
mind that they can by themselves evolve a plan of procedure,
as when he himself carries on the discussion and personally
induces an agreement to accept a specific provision. . . .
(Emphasis supplied).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the case is best summarized by two quotes

from Judge Ronald O. Hyde's Memorandum Decision.

Judge Hyde
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quoted Andersen v. Johnson, supra:
"The primary purpose of real estate business is to selJ
real estate or its use and from such transactions
receive a fee or commission ...
Judge Hyde said:
"I hold directly that: One who undertakes, on a cormnission or fee basis to secure a purchaser for property
belonging to another is within the Real Estate Broker's
Statute and must be licensed. * * '°' Defendants' Motion
for Sunmary Judgment is granted.
The appellant was aware of the above facts and that is
why it designated the $35, 000 payment received from responden
as a "sales commission" and not a finder's fee.
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
DATED this 13th day of January, 1978.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

·.. ----------1····7

~-----y~""
' -~

~ ;((~~;;d/7~ 7-t~
/

/----

-

---~---
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ROBERT v. PHILLIPS
Attorney for Respondents

-10-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

